The current troublemaker of former Governor Rath with the payment of a 14 million bail raises the question: why does the bail market not work in our country? The business model is clear: the court will deposit bail, you don’t have that much cash. You are willing to borrow (and pay some interest) and you will be able to repay, because you only need to go to court to return the principal, which you really have in mind. If they arrest you in the US, just put ” bail bonds ” into Google and a wide range of companies willing to give you bail or just click here to visit lions bail bonds for free.
Less clarification – bail loans are normally offered by insurance companies in legal protection packages. But this is a fundamentally different product that a) most of the accused do not have and b) do not solve a situation where you are charged with a criminal offense and only then bail for cash. It is also possible that part of consumer “loans for anything” from both solid and less solid financial intermediaries is ultimately used on bail. However, bail loans have not spread as a specific product tailored to the criminal process.
It is difficult to say why bail loans have not become a common business in our country. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not limit them in any way, even anticipating them (in §73a para. 1 “… With the consent of the accused, another person may deposit a financial guarantee but must be familiar with the substance of the accusation and facts in which the reason is found before accepting it links. ”). On the other hand, it does not develop them, nor does it regulate the specific position of commercial bailiffs in the criminal proceedings, as is the case in the US.
Is there any drastic regulation elsewhere in the law that prevents bail loans? Perhaps the most important factor is weak demand, ie the potential market is not so deep as to lend bail loans as a specific product. In 2006, the ratio of composite bails to indictments was unbelievable 1/1000. (Today I suppose more, but I did not find a more recent number). For comparison in the US, it is approximately 300/1000. However, we do not know from the low number of collateral bails whether their number is low because the courts have little to offer (and therefore does not make sense of the loan), or whether the courts often offer them, but the charges cannot be passed on and remain in custody ( because for some other reason there is no loan market).
Bail loans, at least as they do in the US, have their drawbacks. In an effort to recover money from the accused who fled the court, commercial guarantors sometimes resort to more harsh practices. The rules are too lenient for them (if the accused does not appear to the court, only a minor part of the guarantee is forfeited to the state, which is not in any case in cash, etc.) In the European concept, private sector involvement in the criminal process is unthinkable.
On the other hand, private guarantors have a clear financial interest in making the accused come to court. Which bears the expected results – the bail bondsman bailiffs are more successful in court than those who have released ceteris paribus in another way (see Helland and Tabarrok, The Fugitive: Evidence on Public Versus Private Law Enforcement) Jail of Bail Jumping Bail loans, if set sensibly, would have a positive impact on our environment. First, they would make bails available to defendants who cannot afford them at the moment. (So I don’t tear a tear over ex-Hetman Rath :). Secondly, they would reduce the number of prisoners held in custody and contribute a little to solving another thorny problem, overcrowded prisons.